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JANUARY 20111. Introduction
Business R&D – the innovative efforts funded and organised on a systematic basis by firms – is a key
ingredient for sustainable growth. Empirical investigations into the drivers of these activities have
intensified over the past 30 years and have evolved to become a distinct area of research. On the
aggregate level, scholars have analysed the cyclicality of business R&D (Barlevy, 2007), its response
to cost reductions caused by subsidies and tax credits (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2003; David et
al, 2000), its reactivity to credit constraints (Aghion et al, 2005), and the industrial structures of
countries (Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe, 2008). These factors have also been addressed on the
microeconomic level in order to test the Schumpeterian hypothesis that large firms and firms with
monopolistic power devote more resources to R&D (e.g., Cohen et al, 1987; Levin and Reiss, 1984). 
One recent stream of research has assessed the effect of corporate governance practices on the R&D
orientation of firms (Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Munari et al, 2010; Aghion et al, 2009). However, few
dimensions of corporate governance have actually been addressed, with the exception of ownership
characteristics (see Table 1 for a review of recent literature on corporate governance arrangements and
innovation). Recent contributions have analyzed the impacts of the degree of ownership concentration
(Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Tribo et al, 2007), owner identity (Hoskisson et al, 2002; Kim et al, 2008; Munari
et al, 2010), the role and composition of the board of directors (Kor, 2006), and compensation
schemes for CEOs, managers and directors (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Coles et al, 2006; Hoskisson et
al, 2002). 
Overall, the empirical evidence varies, and several critical issues have yet to be investigated. First,
existing studies have largely analyzed the effects of a single dimension of corporate governance on
R&D and innovation. Second, these studies tend to measure structural characteristics of governance
1practices (such as the share of external directors in the board), but they do not investigate the actual
implementation or outcomes of such practices in detail. Finally, the empirical evidence is often limited
to single countries (predominantly the United States), while multi-country studies are nearly non-
existent. This is a significant limitation given the heterogeneity of corporate governance systems
around the world (Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Munari et al, 2010). Addressing these issues is important, as
recent empirical evidence indicates that measures designed to improve shareholders’ protection might
have a negative impact on flexibility and risk-taking, as evidenced by the case of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act in the United States (Bargeron et al, 2009; Cohen et al, 2009). 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this growing field by providing new, quantitative insight
into the relationships among several dimensions of the corporate governance of firms and their efforts
in R&D. We test the relationship between multiple corporate governance practices and R&D
investments using a sample of 279 publicly listed western European companies involved in research
activities. Our reliance on a multi-faceted corporate governance index allows us to consider the
simultaneous impact on R&D intensity of four major characteristics of corporate governance provisions
designed to improve transparency and accountability: the role and composition of the board of
directors, the characteristics of the audit committee and internal control system, shareholders’ rights,
and the executive remuneration system. As major investments must generally be validated by the
board, we propose that governance dimensions might affect the management of R&D and the
propensity to invest in such intangible activities. Furthermore, the strategic orientation of top
executives may influence R&D investments depending on their freedom to operate, their mode of
remuneration and the firm’s decision process. As these executives are expected to maximise
shareholder wealth, they are controlled by the board and the shareholders. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 summarises the existing literature on the effect of
corporate governance practices on firm performance and R&D investments, and presents the
2hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample used for the econometric analysis as well as the two main
databases utilised in this study. Section 4 presents and interprets the econometric results. Section 5
provides a discussion of our conclusions and identifies areas for further research.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
2.1. Corporate governance and R&D: theoretical roots and recent advancements
“Corporate governance” refers to the set of internal and external control mechanisms that reduce the
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders arising from the separation of ownership (by
shareholders) and control (by managers) (Berle and Means, 1968;  Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
1 The different dimensions of corporate governance structures and
instruments create a set of conditions that can profoundly affect the nature and direction of innovation
activities. Economic approaches rooted in transaction cost theory and agency theory focus on the high
level of uncertainty that characterises innovation activities, the presence of asymmetric information
between the researchers and the decision makers, and the high level of asset specificity generated by
dedicated R&D investments, as the factors linking governance structures and innovation (Munari and
Sobrero, 2003). According to agency theory, shareholders might benefit from the high risk/high return
strategies associated with R&D investments because of their ability to distribute investment variance
throughout their portfolios. In contrast, managerial risk is inherently firm specific and cannot be
diversified. Managers are, therefore, naturally modelled as risk averse and assumed to prefer short-
term gains derived from efficiency-seeking strategies, which might dampen long-term returns.
1 A comprehensive definition of corporate governance is provided by the OECD (2004): “Corporate governance involves a set of
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective
monitoring” (OECD 2004, p. 11). One possible approach to the corporate governance problem emphasises the roles of external
institutions and laws in alleviating the agency costs arising from the specialisation of management and finance, as in the case of
legal protection given to investors from the risk of expropriation by managers (Shleifer and Vishiny, 1997; La Porta, 1998).
However, in this paper, we explicitly focus on the internal characteristics of a company’s governance system, such as the board of
directors, the audit committee and internal controls, the shareholders’ role, and the monitoring and remuneration systems. 
3In order to provide a more rigorous and complete assessment of the effectiveness of corporate
governance arrangements, recent studies have examined the relationships between a large set of
corporate governance provisions and firm performance (Bebchuck et al, 2009; Gompers et al, 2003;
Klapper and Love, 2004). These studies are based on the calculation of “corporate governance
indexes”, which take an entire set of provisions aimed at enhancing shareholders’ rights into account. 
The interest of a similar approach stems from two intertwined trends that have been evident over the
past two decades. First, in several countries, corporate governance codes have been introduced that
encompass a set of principles and best practices expected to enhance shareholders’ rights. These
codes were motivated by a desire for more transparency and accountability, and by a desire to
increase investor confidence in the stock market. They are often introduced in response to financial
scandals or corporate collapses.
2 Although compliance with such codes is generally voluntary, some
governments have implemented legislative reforms calling for stricter regulation of the governance of
firms, as was the case with the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States. Second, interest in the
topic of corporate governance has surged among governments, investment banks, rating agencies and
other specialised financial institutions, which has led a number of private firms to collect firm-level data
on differences in corporate governance across firms in different countries. The resulting availability of
detailed and longitudinal data facilitates empirical academic research in this field (Bebchuck and
Weisbach, 2009). 
As a result of these trends, a large number of studies link specific characteristics of corporate
governance systems to R&D efforts or innovative output on the company level (see Table 1). However,
this research has provided mixed or controversial evidence (Munari et al, 2010). One possible reason
for the lack of consensus may be a failure to consider the effect of complementarities within the
2 Examples of such codes and guidelines include the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Combined Code (2003) in the United
Kingdom, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), and the Winter Report by the EU High Level Group of
Company Law Experts (2001). A complete list of corporate governance codes introduced worldwide can be found on the
website of the European Corporate Governance Institute: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php.
4governance practices on innovation development. Recently, several scholars have stressed the
importance of considering corporate governance as a system of interdependent elements. They have
explored how multiple practices interact and jointly influence firm performance (Aguilera et al, 2008;
Tosi, 2008). With few exceptions (i.e., Lhuillery, 2009), the literature to date has only focused on a few
facets of corporate governance in terms of its influence on R&D and innovation. Moreover, previous
studies have mainly focused on the US context, so that limited evidence is available on other countries.
2.2 Multiple corporate governance practices and R&D investments
Some studies have found that corporate governance provisions designed to strengthen shareholder
rights may lead to positive economic results on the company level, perhaps in the form of improved
operating performance or higher market valuation (Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004).
However, recent work has also emphasised that some of these provisions are likely to discourage risk
taking by public companies, thereby leading to a reduction in R&D and capital expenditures (Bargeron
et al, 2009; Cohen et al, 2009).  For instance, Shadab (2008) argues that by increasing outside
monitoring and emphasising financial control, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) might have had a
detrimental effect on innovation-related activities. Empirical support for this claim is provided by two
recent empirical studies (Bargeron  et al, 2009 and Cohen  et al, 2007) that demonstrate that US
companies significantly reduced their investments in R&D after the SOX was implemented.
These results suggest that, in the long run, the adoption of corporate governance provisions aimed at
strengthening shareholders’ rights might have some unintended consequences in the form of a
reduction of investments in R&D and innovation. However, existing empirical evidence is limited,
especially for countries other than the United States.
3 For that reason, this paper tests the relationship
between multiple corporate governance practices and R&D investments for a sample of western
3 An exception is suggested by Lhuillery (2009) based on a sample of 110 large, publicly listed French business groups.
Lhuillery finds that most shareholder-oriented practices have a positive impact on R&D investments. However, Lhuillery
also finds two exceptions for practices that are key in the shareholders’ model – compensation schemes and voting rules –
and the author finds no support for the hypothesis of complementarity between practices.
5European companies. The construction of a unique corporate governance index allows us to consider
the simultaneous impact of four major characteristics of corporate governance provisions: 
1. The role and composition of the board of directors (BD); 
2. The characteristics of the audit committee and internal control system (AC); 
3. Shareholders’ rights (SR); and 
4. The executive remuneration system (ER). 
This paper, therefore, considers the influence that practices aimed at protecting shareholders’ rights
have on R&D investments. The following sections briefly summarise the findings of existing literature
on the influence of each governance dimension on R&D investments. The review suggests that the
benefits of improving legal protection for shareholders through governance provisions may be partially
offset by hidden costs related to the reduction of flexibility and risk taking. These changes may
ultimately lead to lower levels of R&D investments.
2.2.1 The role and composition of the board of directors (BD)
One of the most important internal corporate governance mechanisms used to reduce the agency
problem between managers and shareholders is the board of directors.
4 Organisational control theory
(Eisenhardt, 1985) implies that because directors are responsible for controlling, evaluating and
rewarding management performance, their characteristics and behaviour may consistently affect
managers’ strategic decision-making processes and, hence, firm performance.
Some studies have highlighted the potential impact of the board’s characteristics on a firm’s propensity
to engage in R&D activities, to promote corporate entrepreneurship, and to undertake strategic change
4 As the legal representatives of corporate stockholders, directors have the formal authority to ratify managers’ decisions, to
monitor executive behaviour and performance, and to evaluate and reward managers. The board of directors generally nominates
additional organs, such as remuneration, audit and nomination committees, which are generally allowed to make decisions with
greater independence.
6or renewal (Hill and Snell, 1988; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Zahra, 1996). In particular, the
composition of the board of directors – in terms of the presence of external directors and the proportion
of external directors to internal directors – has been often identified as an important element in efforts
to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests to temperate the agency problem.
5 External directors
may lack the necessary specific knowledge and experience with the firm’s capabilities and processes,
and they may have insufficient knowledge of the environment in which the firm competes. In contrast,
internal directors actively participate in the operations of the company, have a superior amount of
information with higher quality, and, consequently, should be more competent in assessing the
strategic desirability of decisions and their potential consequences in the short or long run (Baysinger
and Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger et al, 1991; Hill and Snell, 1988; Zhara, 1996).
From these considerations, it follows that the balance between internal and external directors within
the board is particularly important for firms facing high levels of uncertainty and dynamism, such as
R&D-intensive firms. Similarly, the control of the agenda by a chairman who is not the CEO will not
benefit companies active in uncertain and dynamic environments because decisions need to be made
quickly in such situations (Eisenhardt, 1989). Following this line of reasoning, corporate governance
practices increasing the degree of board independence, such as those suggested by the OECD code of
practices or favoured by the SOX Act, might have unintended negative consequences in terms of
corporate risk-taking and innovation. 
Hypothesis 1: A transparent policy for board member designation (including the chairman) and a high
ratio of independent directors will negatively affect R&D intensity.
5 Other studies focus on the demographic characteristics of the directors. For instance, Lacetera (2000) has studied specific
attributes of board members, such as their scientific background, that might affect R&D intensity. 
72.2.2 The role of internal controls and audit committees (AC)
Several corporate governance codes promoted in the recent past emphasise the importance of
companies’ internal control mechanisms for the prevention and monitoring of the risk of error or fraud
by corporate managers (Mallin, 2003). Internal control systems aim to provide reasonable assurance
that: a) financial information is reliable; b) legal regulations, and internal rules and procedures are
respected; and c) the company's main processes operate efficiently. In this respect, one of the most
controversial aspects of SOX is Section 404, which urges companies to evaluate and disclose the
accuracy of their internal financial controls in annual reports (Bargeron et al, 2009).
6
 
Two criticisms of the introduction of internal control systems have been put forth. First, internal control
mechanisms are costly to implement, especially for companies that have specialised knowledge,
intangible resources, decentralised organisational structures or complex transactions. Bargeron et al
(2009) argue that the costs associated with Section 404 of SOX are higher for innovative companies
and that they may lead to reduced investments in projects characterised by a high degree of
uncertainty. Second, some corporate governance codes and legislation (eg Section 301 of SOX)
explicitly require the increasing independence of the audit committee from management and the
involvement of financial experts. Such requirements strengthen the emphasis on financial control
systems and may reduce the propensity to invest in R&D projects (Shadab, 2008). Klein’s study
(2002) of a sample of companies listed on the S&P 500 finds that the level of audit committee
independence  decreases  among  companies  with  high-growth  opportunities  because  of  the
complexities and uncertainties associated with operating in such an environment. 
6 In 2003, the SEC implemented this requirement, which requires companies with a given market capitalisation to disclose the
following information about internal controls in annual reports: “[…] (a) a statement of management’s responsibility for
establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls; (b) identification of the framework used by management to evaluate the
adequacy of the internal controls; (c) a statement as to whether or not the system of internal controls as of year-end is effective;
(d) disclosure of any ‘‘material weaknesses’’ in the system of internal controls; and (e) a report by the company’s external auditor
attesting to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls” (Bargeron et al, 2009).
8To the best of our knowledge, few studies examine the effects of the adoption of internal control
systems or the composition of audit committee on R&D investments. The audit committee does not
seem to have a significant influence on strategic decisions, such as investments in R&D or in risky
projects. Therefore, a direct impact cannot be assumed.
Hypothesis 2: The creation of an independent audit committee will have no impact on R&D intensity.
2.2.3. Shareholders’ rights (SR)
Corporate governance provisions primarily aim to reduce the agency problems that arise from the
separation of ownership and control. Corporate governance codes and rating systems generally focus
on principles and mechanisms oriented towards reinforcing shareholders’ rights. They aim to guarantee
the equitable treatment of all shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of voice through voting
(OECD, 1999; Gompers et al, 2003).
7 Recent studies have shown that the adoption of a system of
corporate governance provisions that enhances shareholders’ rights is associated with a higher stock
market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q (Gompers et al, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004). The long-
term impact of such practices on innovation efforts, however, is not completely understood. 
First, the presence and influence of large shareholders can contribute to the monitoring of managerial
action and affect strategic decision making relative to investments in R&D activities. The rationale,
rooted in agency theory, posits that the higher the stockholding concentration, the easier and less
costly it should be for individual stockholders to coordinate the collection and diffusion of relevant
information, or to signal a credible threat of retaliation to a reluctant management team. In other words,
large shareholders have greater abilities and more incentives to monitor investment activity and
7 For instance, Gompers et al (2003) present numerous examples of restrictions (at least 24) that limit shareholders’ rights and
increase managerial power. They include the existence of anti-takeover devices, unequal voting rights (limiting the voting rights of
some shareholders and expanding those of others), and special meeting requirements (increasing the level of shareholder
support required to call a special meeting). In contrast, more “democratic” corporate governance schemes aim to eliminate or
reduce such restrictions in order to strengthen shareholders’ rights.
9encourage those that are likely to generate innovation. A number of studies have addressed the
influence of ownership concentration on R&D investments but the results have been mixed. Several
studies find that stock concentration is positively related to R&D investments (Hansen and Hill, 1991;
Hill et al, 1988; Hosono et al, 2004; Lee and O’Neil, 2003), while others find a negative (Yafeh and
Yosha, 2003) or no significant relationship (Francis and Smith, 1995).
8
Second, in terms of the market’s role in corporate control, critics have argued that takeover pressures
might force managers to reduce profitable long-term investments in favour of short-term investments
offering immediate results (for contradictory results, see Stein, 1988, and Meulbroek et al, 1990).
Therefore, some practices that enhance shareholders’ rights might influence the R&D-orientation of
firms. This seems logical in relation to the medium to long-term performance of firms, which must rely
on R&D investments in order to stay competitive.
Hypothesis 3: The egalitarian treatment of shareholders and the absence of anti-takeover devices will
negatively affect a firm’s propensity to invest in R&D.
2.2.4 The executive remuneration system (ER)
Compensation schemes and remuneration plans are another critical area for shareholders in terms of
steering management actions toward their objective of return maximisation. Research in internal
control theory focuses on the type of information being collected and processed by corporate level
managers and the board on the basis of the assumption that this information can help predict the firm’s
investment strategy and its propensity to innovate (Johnson et al, 1993; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988;
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989, 1990). According to Eishenardt (1985, p.137), control systems not
only reward and measure behaviours – they also alter risk-sharing patterns.
8 A growing number of studies consider other factors that may moderate the relation between ownership structure and innovation,
including differences in the characteristics of the owners (Berrone et al, 2007; David et al, 2001; Hoskisson et al, 2002; Whitley,
1999). Several studies evaluate the impact on R&D investment of shareholding by institutional investors (Aghion and Van Reenen,
2008; Bushee, 1998; David et al, 2001; Hoskisson et al, 2002; Kochhar and David, 1996); by families (Munari et al, 2010); by the
state (Munari et al, 2003); and by banks and financial institutions (Tribo et al, 2007).
10According to this literature, compensation schemes that are tightly linked to financial indicators of
success may lead managers to focus on more predictable and easily measurable short-term activities,
ultimately hampering the commitment to innovative projects (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Hitt et al,
1996). Several studies have tried to assess the impact of compensation schemes (such as stock,
stock options or bonuses) aimed at aligning directors’ and managers’ objectives with shareholders’
views. However, the findings are inconclusive – some studies show a positive association between
stock ownership and R&D spending (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Coles et al, 2006; Hoskisson et al,
2002), while others find indications of a negative relationship (Holthausen et al, 1995; Lacetera, 2001;
Souder and Shaver, 2010). 
It can be argued that compensation based on short-term financial performance is likely to negatively
affect the R&D intensity of a firm. In addition, the use of stock options has a negative impact when a
research project has a longer horizon than the option. Contrary to the popular view, severance pay
could offset this short-term perspective by insuring the executive a high level of compensation if the
risky project is not fruitful. In this case, one must differentiate between risk taking in R&D and purely
financial risk taking. 
Hypothesis 4:  A remuneration system for top executives based on financial performance will
negatively affect a firm’s propensity to invest in R&D, as well as the absence of severance pay. 
11Table 1: Recent studies on governance and innovation 
Authors Year Country Dependent Var. Explanatory factors
Aghion et al 2009 1,000
listed US
firms
Patents (weighted
by citations) and
R&D experience
Proportion of stock held by institutional investors 
Coles et al 2006 US R&D/total assets Executive compensation
David et al 2001 73 US
firms
R&D/sales; number of
new product
announcements
Cumulative institutional activism; new institutional activism
Hosono et al 2004
 
Japan
 
R&D experience/ total
assets
 
Ratio of large shareholders to total shareholders; leverage ratio; share of bank loans in
total debt
In 1989: keiretsu affiliation and cross-shareholdings
Hoskisson et al 2002 234 US
firms
Internal/external
innovation
Institutional ownership; internal directors 
Kim et al 2008 253
Korean
firms
R&D/sales
Family ownership; affiliated ownership; domestic institutional ownership; foreign
ownership
Kor
2006
77 US
firms R&D/sales Top management team composition; board composition (external/internal)
Lacetera 2000 US R&D/sales Insiders and scientists in boards
Lhuillery
2009
France
SBF-120
Index R&D/employee. Governance index (non linear); foreign quotes
Lee and O’Neil
2003
US and
Japan R&D/sales Ownership concentration
Munari et al 2010 France,
Germany,
Italy,
Norway, 
R&D/sales Financial institution; family ownership; state ownership
 Sweden,
UK
Ortega-Argilés et al 2003 Spain Dummy variable =1
with R&D experience
More than 50% of shares; separation of owner/manager; abroad; foreign and public
Smith et al 2003 Denmark R&D probability Number of blockholders; legal form and foreign market
Tribo et al  2007  3,638
Spanish
firms
R&D/sales Number of blockholders; bank ownership; corporate ownership; individual ownership
This table reports the studies published from 2000 to 2010 on the relationship between corporate governance and innovation. For a review of previous studies, see Munari and Sobrero (2003). Tylecote and Ramirez (2006)
show that governance structure influences the specialisation of countries in specific industrial sectors. Should these sectors be R&D intensive, one would expect to find some relation to governance.
123. Empirical investigation
To test if the main components of corporate governance affect firms’ propensities to invest in R&D, two
databases were merged. The first database (provided by Vigeo) relates to the measurement of corporate
governance practices, while the second (from the European Commission) relates to R&D expenditures. Even
if firms in a given country face similar governance rules, there is no guarantee of their effective enforcement
(Khanna  et al, 2006). Therefore, the implementation of such rules must be monitored by independent
agencies (public or private). Vigeo is one such firm. It is an independent rating agency based in France that
assesses the corporate governance setting of publicly listed companies on the basis of the four broad
governance criteria discussed in the previous section:
- Board of Directors (BD)
- Audit and Internal Controls (AC)
- Shareholders’ rights (SR) 
- Executive remuneration (ER)
Each criterion is subdivided by Vigeo into three levels of commitment: liabilities (L), implementation (I) and
results (R). Liabilities refer to the existence of the basic practices that would protect shareholders.
Implementation reflects the operationalisation of these practices. Results encompass the shareholders’
satisfaction (e.g., approval at general meetings) and the level of realisation (e.g., reliability of financial
statements). Twelve scores are therefore available (see Table 2), each of which is computed as a weighted
average of several topics. Because of confidentiality constraints, the actual weight of each question cannot
be disclosed.
9 
9 Two examples of computation with hypothetical figures help to clarify the scoring method. 1) BD-L: 0.75*100 + 0.25*0 = 75. A score of
100 indicates that there is a nomination committee for the board of directors and no executive sits on this committee, while a score of 0
indicates that the CEO and the chairman of the board are the same person. 2) SR-L: 0.5*80+0.5*100 = 90. A score of 80 indicates that there
are some safeguards (but not all) on the transactions executed by large shareholders, while a score of 100 indicates that all the
shareholders can easily attend the annual general meeting (AGM) and add items to the agenda.
13Scores for each topic are assigned so that the “better” or more transparent a governance practice is relative to
the governance code, the higher the score. A global governance score (CG score) is also computed by Vigeo as
a weighted average of the four sub-criteria scores (BD, AC, SR and ER).
10
Table 2: Basic scores for corporate governance practices
Criteria Levels of commitment Score Topics of questions (the more the conditions
are met, the higher the score)
Board of Directors (BD) Liabilities (L) BD-L - Existence and independence of
nomination committee
- Chairman of the board not the CEO
Implementation (I) BD-I - Percentage of independent board
members 
- Skills and background of non-
executive members
- Training provided for board members
- Regular attendance at board
meetings
Results (R) BD-R - Regular election and evaluation of
board members
Audit and Internal Controls
(AC)
Liabilities (L) AC-L - Existence and independence of an
audit committee
- Skills and backgrounds of audit
committee members
- Scope of risks covered by internal
control systems
Implementation (I) AC-I - Role of the audit committee in
relation to internal and external controls 
- Rotation of external auditors
Results (R) AC-R - Independence of external auditors
- Reliability of financial statements
- CSR reporting
Shareholders’ rights (SR) Liabilities (L) SR-L - Limitation of voting rights
restrictions (one share – one vote – one
dividend policy)
- Limitation of anti-takeover devices
Implementation (I) SR-I - Safeguards relative to transactions
with major shareholders
- AGM: access and agenda
modification possibility
10 One hypothetical example of the calculation of the global governance code could be: 0.2*100 +0.3 *70 +0.2*80 + 0.3 *100 = 87, where
BD = 100; AC = 70; SR = 80 and ER = 100.
14Results (R) SR-R - Voting results (consensus among
shareholders at AGM)
Executive Remuneration (ER) Liabilities (L) ER-L - Existence and independence of
remuneration committee
- Disclosure of senior executives’
remuneration
Implementation (I) ER-I - Link between incentives and
economic performance (financial ratio and
stock options)
Results (R) ER-R - Limitations of severance pay
allowed for executives
- Approval of executive remuneration
by the annual general meeting 
The Vigeo database covers several European countries and several manufacturing sectors, which provides a
unique research perspective. The corporate governance of each company is assessed every 18 months. The
database covers five years (2003 to 2007). However, the uneven distribution of the observations prevents
the use of a balanced panel data analysis. The database focuses on the Dow Jones STOXX Europe 600 Index,
and is composed of 1,315 observations on firms mostly originating from the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Several industries are covered, although a larger share of firms
are active in financial services, consumer services, industrial goods and services, and utilities-energy (Table
3).
15Table 3: Distribution of observations by sector and region in each database (%)
Frequency %
Variables
Corporate
governance
database (Vigeo)
R&D database
(European
Commission)
Final database
Sectors   
Automobiles 2.6 4.6 6.8
Chemicals 4.1 5.8 8.5
Construction basic 8.6 5.6 6.8
Consumer services 21.2 4.9 7.3
Financials 20.5 3.2 4.6
Food and beverage 5.0 4.1 5.9
Health care 3.2 13.6 8.5
Industrial goods and services 12.7 26.6 15.1
Personal and household goods 3.3 5.6 3.7
Technology 7.5 17.4 14.4
Telecommunications 3.3 4.0 6.6
Utilities-energy 7.8 4.7 11.7
Countries   
France, Belgium and Luxembourg 20.8 15.7 24.4
Germany 8.3 17.8 13.7
Nordic countries 10.7 19.0 13.7
Southern countries 15.1 6.6 7.3
Switzerland and Austria 6.7 6.5 8.8
The Netherlands 5.3 4.5 4.9
The UK and Ireland 33.2 29.9 27.3
Years   
2003 3.0 15.9 13.7
2004 20.3 21.7 22.4
2005 28.5 31.1 27.3
2006 23.0 31.3 36.6
2007 25.2 0 0
# observations 1,315 3,163 409
Data on R&D expenditures is obtained from the scoreboards for the most R&D-intensive companies in the
world, which are released each year by the European Commission. The scoreboards are constructed from
audited annual reports of consolidated groups. The country in which the company is registered is used as its
geographical origin (European Commission, 2007). The number of observations per scoreboard varies over
time. For the purpose of the present study, data on the R&D to net sales ratio and the number of employees
from 2003 (top 500) to 2006 (top 1,000) was used. The distribution among sectors and countries differs from
the corporate governance database, as companies are more focused in industrial goods and services, health
care and technology, and the share of companies in the Nordic countries is higher (Table 3).
16Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the main variables 
Database Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation Obs.
CG score Corp. gov. 46.8 3.00 91.0 16.9 1315
F i n a l4 6 . 37 . 0 09 1 . 01 6 . 2 4 0 9
R&D/sales R&D 12.2 0.01 532.0 34.7 3163
Final 4.3 0.01 45.2 6.1 409
R&D/empl. R&D 18.5 0.01 411.1 33.0 3163
F i n a l1 1 . 50 . 0 41 0 1 . 6 1 7 . 6 4 0 9
Sales
(EUR millions)
R&D 5475.6 5 260.0 16,007.6 3163
Final 18358.4 129 260.3 31,952.9 409
Empl.
R&D 20483.91 17 507641 47735.52 3163
Final 55877.60 290 507641 74040.68 409
The corporate governance and R&D databases were matched to create the final database used for the
empirical analysis. As a result of the matching, the sample size decreased to 409 observations, which can be
explained by the fact that the most capitalised companies are not particularly active in R&D, especially in the
services industry. Firms’ geographical locations were grouped into regional areas according to two main
criteria: geographical proximity and the regional legal systems defined by La Porta (1998). The Nordic group
includes Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and the southern group includes Spain, Italy, Portugal and
Greece. Firms are therefore classified as originating in one of seven regions or countries, and they are
classified by sector. The means of the variables in the “R&D database” and in the “final database” are
different. When moving from the R&D database to the final database, R&D intensity decreases and becomes
more centred: minima are higher and maxima are lower, which means that potential outliers have been
suppressed. 
174. Empirical results
Before examining the relationship between corporate governance and R&D, four regressions were performed
to check the robustness of the results across the two databases and their congruence with past studies.
11
CG it φ  = c +   country χ  +   sector ψ  +   t + μ it, and (1)
IRD it φ  = c +   country χ  +   sector ψ  +   t + μ it. (2)
The corporate governance score is essentially explained by the geographical origin of firms (country
dummies explain nearly half the variance: 48.7%). The countries that are significant for the corporate
governance data remain significant in the final sample, which attests to the role of regional business cultures
and legislation in the adoption of governance mechanisms. In short, origination from the Netherlands, the UK
and Ireland has a positive impact on the corporate governance score, while origination from the southern
region has a negative impact. This result confirms the differences in corporate governance and shareholder
treatment found by La Porta et al (1998). The sector effects show less significance in the final sample. 
Table 5: Results of regressions of CG score and R&D intensity (RDI)
Dependent variables CG score RDI
Corp Final R&D Final
The Netherlands 11.185*** 5.394*** -1.031 0.444
Switzerland and Austria 1.462*** 1.638*** -1.636 1.008
Southern countries -6.453*** -5.757*** -4.811* 0.380
Nordic countries 1.103*** 0.869*** 3.122* -0.556
France, Belgium and Luxembourg -1.739*** -1.916*** -2.410 0.032
The UK and Ireland 22.868*** 24.700*** 2.792 0.687
11The companies are indexed by i (i=1 …279) and the years are indexed by t (t φ = 1...4).   country χ ,   sector ψ  and   t are country, sector and
time dummies, respectively. An intercept (c) is included with the three sets of dummies. One country dummy (Germany as reference
country), one sector (consumer services) and one year (2003) are suppressed in the control variables, as they are the closest to the
median value.
18Automobiles -2.971*** -4.565*** 3.325 3.032*
Personal and household goods -4.658*** -7.814*** 1.272 0.852
Financials 3.155*** -1.525*** -0.165 -0.099
Telecommunications 1.920*** 2.356*** 6.468* -0.098
Health care -1.420*** -5.331*** 42.789*** 12.538***
Food and beverage -3.837*** -1.997*** -1.330 -0.311
Chemicals 1.963*** -0.948*** 1.142 2.207**
Technology 1.063*** 1.054*** 16.020*** 9.515***
Utilities-energy 3.205*** 2.265*** -0.674 -0.923
Industrial goods and services -1.931*** -2.304*** 2.384 2.610***
Construction basic -1.096*** 0.149*** -1.768 -0.776
2004 5.271*** 8.455***
2005 4.380*** 5.053*** -3.141* -0.360
2006 4.394*** 6.924*** -1.702 -0.974
2007 4.703***        -2.014 -1.003
Intercept 34.91*** 34.60*** 3.85 1.80
Adj. R
2 0.486*** 0.498*** 0.174 0.499
Obs. 1,315*** 409*** 3,163 409
Significance: * at 10%, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%. The “final” database corresponds to the merger of the two databases (CG and RDI).
Sources: CG database, EC’s R&D scoreboard. 
R&D intensity is mostly explained by the firm’s sector and much less by the firm’s geographical origin. Of the
sectors, health care and technology have a particularly strong effect, while the industrial sectors alone
explain 50.1% of the variance. Companies originating from southern countries have significantly less R&D
intensity, while companies originating from the Nordic countries show significantly more R&D intensity. In the
final sample, the industry dummies are generally more significant. The observed variance in R&D intensity
confirms the results of Mathieu and van Pottelsberghe (2010), who found much greater variance in R&D
intensity across industries than across countries. Given the structural differences between the major
explanatory variables of corporate governance (more geographically related) and R&D intensity (more
related to the industrial sector), the governance factor is expected to play a relatively limited role in the R&D
intensity model. 
19A GLM model is used to test the impact of a firm’s corporate governance structure on its R&D intensity (see
equation (3)). This model takes the heteroscedasticity of the error term into account. The model explains firm-
level R&D intensity (IRD it) in terms of various corporate governance scores (CGit), firm size and several control
variables. The companies are indexed by i (i=1 …279) and years are indexed by t (t φ = 1...4).   country χ    sector
ψ and   t are the country, sector and time-specific vectors of dummies. Lit is the number of employees and
controls for the size effect. As in the previous regressions, an intercept is included. One country dummy
(Germany), one sector dummy (consumer services) and one year dummy (2003) serve as the benchmarks.
IRD it α  = c +   CG it β  +   L it φ  +   country χ  +   sector ψ  +   year + μ it. (3)
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the results for firm size, geographical dummies and year effects. The number of
employees has a clear negative and significant impact on R&D intensity. Contrary to the Schumpeterian
hypothesis, the results suggest that large firms are less R&D intensive. In terms of country groupings,
southern countries, Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland all have a significant negative impact, which means
that firms from these countries invest relatively less in R&D than firms in Austria, Switzerland, Germany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France. The unexpected negative impact of Nordic origination can
be explained by the fact that some information was lost by merging Sweden and Finland with less R&D-
intensive countries like Denmark and Norway.
The sector dummies are added in column (2), five of which have a highly significant and positive impact:
chemicals, industrial goods and services, automobiles, technology, and health care. As in Table 5, the
geographical dummies lose their significance, which suggests that once the industrial structure is taken into
account, country differences in R&D intensity vanish. In column (3), the corporate governance (CG) score is
included but it does not seem to add any additional information, as the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion: the
20goodness of fit of the model) criterion does not decrease. The parameter associated with corporate
governance is not significantly different from zero.
Table 6: Impact of corporate governance practices (CG score) on R&D intensity
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  
CG score -0.01 -0.01  
 St. error 0.02 0.02  
CG score (PCA) -0.02 **
 St. error 0.01  
Log Empl -1.40 *** -0.49 *** -0.47 ** -7.67 *** -7.60 ***
 St. error 0.23 0.18 0.19 1.89 1.89  
Log Empl squared 0.36 *** 0.36 ***
 St. error 0.09 0.09  
The Netherlands -0.04 0.26 0.34 0.63 0.98  
Switzerland and Austria -0.13 0.55 0.59 0.78 0.95  
Southern countries -3.14 ** 0.08 0.01 0.52 0.54  
Nordic countries -2.65 ** -1.06 -1.03 -0.25 0.05  
France, Belgium and
Luxembourg -0.89 -0.23 -0.25 -0.14 -0.09  
UK Ireland -1.69 * 0.26 0.60 0.89 1.93 **
Automobiles 3.69 *** 3.60 *** 3.34 *** 3.01 **
Personal and household Goods 1.06 0.95 1.41 1.12  
Financials 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.17  
Telecommunications 0.35 0.36 0.25 0.37  
Health care 12.53 *** 12.46 *** 12.53 *** 12.31 ***
Food and beverage 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.30  
Chemicals 2.32 ** 2.30 ** 2.75 ** 2.74 **
Technology 9.12 *** 9.15 *** 8.78 *** 8.77 ***
Utilities-energy -0.66 -0.64 -0.62 -0.62  
Industrial goods & services 2.94 *** 2.89 *** 2.88 *** 2.69 ***
Construction basic -0.42 -0.43 -0.38 -0.45  
2004 -1.33 -0.44 -0.33 -0.46 -0.04  
2005 -2.66 * -1.06 -0.99 -1.10 -0.68  
2006 -1.82 -1.14 -1.04 -1.31 -0.83  
Intercept 21.79 *** 7.04 *** 7.29 *** 42.11 *** 42.19 ***
#  obs. 409  409  409  409  409  
AIC 6.39 5.81 5.81 5.78 5.77  
BIC 11125   4837   4834   4579   4503  
Significance: * at 10%; ** at 5 % and *** at 1% probability thresholds.
“CG score” is the weighted average of the four main components (BD, AC, SR and ER), while “CG score (PCA)” reflects the coordinates
of the firms on the first factorial axis of a principal component analysis of the same four components (see Table 2). The principal
component analysis is presented in the Appendix, Table A.5.
21In column (4), the squared size variable (number of employees) is included in the model to test whether a
non-linear relationship exists between firm size and R&D intensity. The negative impact of firm size and the
positive impact of the squared variable suggest that a U-shape curve depicts the relationship between firm
size and relative efforts in research activities – small firms and large firms undertake more research than
medium-size firms. This quadratic model confirms the results presented by Grabowski and Vernon (1994),
and Lacetera (2000) that the relationship between size and R&D efforts is U-shaped in high R&D-intensive
industries. 
The CG score variable is ‘imposed’ by Vigeo’s chosen weighted average of sub-scores, which are, in turn,
averages of several questions. Therefore, we conducted a principal component analysis of the four
subcomponents of the corporate governance survey. The coordinates of the firms on the first factorial axis
were then used as explanatory variables (see the principal component analysis presented in Appendix Table
A5). The first factorial axis, which captures 58% of the variance, provides an alternative governance index to
the weighted average provided by Vigeo. The results presented in column (5) suggest that the corporate
governance index derived from the coordinates on the first factorial axis correlates negatively and
significantly with firms’ R&D intensity. This result reflects the combination of the four hypotheses, all of which
predict that governance practices will have a negative or null effect on R&D intensity.
 
The negative impact means that the higher the score (i.e., the better the governance practices), the lower the
R&D intensity. There are two ways to interpret this relationship. The first is that better governance should
induce more efficient management (and, hence, more productive research activities). Therefore, the
company should need fewer resources to generate profitable, innovative ideas. Indeed, some scholars have
shown that better governance might lead to better performance (Gompers et al, 2001; Bhagat et al, 2008).
The second interpretation is that the companies that promote better governance do so to the detriment of
research activities, which are intrinsically risky and highly uncertain. A high score might indicate a willingness
22to be more “attractive” for the equity market and, perhaps, an overly strong focus on short-term returns to the
detriment of long-term strategies. Here, the “short-termism” of some governance practices would be an issue
for R&D-intensive companies. 
Table 7: Impact of corporate governance practices (sub-global scores) on R&D intensity 
Variables BD  AC   SR  ER  
BD (board of directors) -0.02
 St. error 0.01
AC (audit committee) -1 10
-3
 St. error 0.02
SR (shareholders’ rights) -0.02 **
 St. error 0.01
ER (executive remuneration) -0.05 ***
 St. error 0.01
Log Employment -7.75 *** -7.71 *** -7.63 *** -7.70 ***
 St. error 1.90 1.90 1.89 1.87
Log Employment squared 0.37 *** 0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.37 ***
 St. error 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09
Country Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant term 42.15 *** 41.51 *** 42.39 *** 42.00 ***
Obs. 407  407   407  407  
AIC 5.78  5.79   5.78  5.76  
BIC 4575  4598   4524  4426  
Significance: * at 10%, ** at 5 % and *** at 1% probability thresholds. BD stands for the average score related to the board of directors,
AC is related to audit and control systems, SR is related to shareholders’ rights, and ER is related to the executive remuneration
schedule.
The negative relationship between a global governance score and R&D intensity might actually “hide” some
strong links between R&D and only a few sub-components of the corporate governance score. This possibility
is investigated in Table 7, which shows that the BD (board of directors) and AC (audit committee and control
system) variables are not associated with a significant parameter. In other words, the degree of corporate
skills and independence of the board have no influence or only a weak influence on a firm’s propensity to
invest in R&D. This result, therefore, does not validate hypothesis 1. The same is true for the audit process of
the firm. Good control and transparency from the audit committee do not have an immediate impact on R&D
intensity, which is in line with the second hypothesis. The design of audit control is too far removed from
decisions to invest in R&D. The parameter associated with the SR variable is significant and negative, which
23means that the higher a company scores in terms of its shareholders’ rights policy, the less it tends to invest
in R&D. The same observation applies to the ER variable. In fact, the remuneration dimension appears to be
the most significant variable. One interpretation of its negative impact is that the more top management’s
remuneration is associated with firm performance, the lower the long-term commitment to risky projects is
likely to be. This, in turn, indicates a lower R&D intensity. 
At first glance, hypotheses 3 and 4 are confirmed, which suggests that shareholders’ rights and executive
remuneration systems affect the extent to which a firm invests in R&D. In order to obtain a more in-depth
understanding  of  these  relationships,  the  effect  of  each  of  their  three  sub-components  (liability,
implementation and results) is tested (Table 8). Negative and significant impacts on R&D intensity are
associated with shareholders’ rights liability and with the three dimensions of the executive remuneration
system. The shareholders’ rights liability (SR-L) indicator measures the voting right restrictions and the anti-
takeover devices. More precisely, the value of this indicator is higher when the company respects the "one
share – one vote – one dividend" principle (i.e., there are no voting rights restrictions) and when there is no
reference to anti-takeover devices in the company's reporting. The executive remuneration system liability
(ER-L) indicator takes stock of the creation and independence of the remuneration committee, and of the
disclosure of senior executives’ pay. The implementation (ER-I) indicator accounts for incentive plans, and
the results (ER-R) indicator examines severance pay and remuneration votes at annual general assemblies. 
In terms of the role of SR-L, a decrease of voting right restrictions, which should lead to the principle “one
share – one vote – one dividend”, tends to reduce R&D investments. This result might be interpreted in the
light of literature suggesting that the presence of large, stable shareholders (such as strong blockholders with
concentrated voting power) may favour long-term investment policies, including those focused on R&D and
innovation activities (Hansen and Hill, 1991; Hill et al, 1988; Hosono et al, 2004; Lee and O’Neil, 2003). At the
same time, this result indicates that the issuance of non-voting shares or the issuance of preferential shares
24does not prevent R&D activity. However, if the company scores high and is therefore close to the “one share –
one vote – one dividend” principle, it is likely to attract investors interested in fast returns and unprepared to
agree to the long-term commitments typically needed for research projects. 
In terms of anti-takeover rules, the weaker the presence of anti-takeover devices (the higher the score), the
lower the R&D intensity. Companies need to have some assurance regarding their future and their
independence to make long-term investments in research projects. This result is consistent with the
literature, which suggests that the presence of anti-takeover provisions could protect managers from
takeover pressures and lead to an increase in R&D expenditures (Stein, 1988). This may be logical but it is
contrary to the view that takeovers act as a regulatory tool against poor performing companies (Becht, 2002).
As for ER-L, one could speculate that the independence of the remuneration committee has a negative impact
because independent directors can ignore the specificities of the R&D projects and fail to optimally evaluate
the appropriate level of remuneration for managers who opt to pursue research-driven strategies. The second
component of ER-L relates to the disclosure of the remuneration. 
The adoption of performance-related executive remuneration (ER-I) also has a negative effect on R&D
intensity. Existing studies fail to reach a consensus on this issue. For example, Holthausen (1995) finds a
negative relation. One explanation is related to the design of the contract, which aims to decrease agency
problems and does not specifically encourage R&D. Furthermore, companies’ performance measures are
mostly based on financial ratios, which offer objective metrics but suffer from short-termism and encourage
low-risk strategies (Munari and Sobrero, 2003). If a company’s performance assessment is based on a
strategic control system rather than a financial control system, shareholders will tend to value R&D more
highly (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988). 
25ER-R encompasses two topics: severance pay (i.e., the monetary package employees receive when they are
dismissed from a firm) and voting results (i.e., the extent to which shareholders approve resolutions on
executive remuneration). The estimates suggest that the higher the severance pay (the smaller the index),
the higher the R&D intensity. Indeed, managers with high severance pay might be more willing to undertake
risky projects, especially projects that are R&D intensive. In terms of the voting results, the more
shareholders approve of the executive remuneration, the less R&D is promoted. Firms with antagonistic
shareholders tend to challenge themselves more and tend to be more innovative. We can therefore assume
that firms with critical shareholders who challenge remuneration resolutions tend to be more innovative.
Table 8: Results with basic scores as explanatory variables
Variables SR-L SR-I  SR-R ER-L ER-I   ER-R
SR-L -0.01 *  
 St. errors 0.01  
SR-I -4.710
-3  
 St. errors 0.01  
SR-R -0.01  
 St. errors 0.01  
ER-L -0.02 *  
 St. errors 0.01  
ER-I -0.02 **  
 St. errors 0.01  
ER-R -0.02 **
 St. errors 0.01  
Log Empl -7.73 *** -7.72 *** -7.65 *** -8.06 *** -7.49 *** -7.48 ***
 St. errors 1.89 1.90 1.89 1.90 1.89 1.89  
Log Empl sq 0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.36 *** 0.38 *** 0.36 *** 0.35 ***
 St. errors 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09  
Country Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Constant term 42.83 *** 41.55 *** 41.43 *** 43.29 *** 41.05 *** 40.40 ***
Obs. 407  407   407  407  407   407  
AIC 5.78  5.79   5.78  5.78  5.77   5.77  
BIC 4539  4598   4555  4541  4514   4506  
Significance: * at 10%, ** at 5 % and *** at 1% probability thresholds.
In summary, all of the scores related to the executive remuneration system have a significant, negative
impact on a firm’s propensity to invest in R&D. As discussed in Munari and Sobrero (2003), the linking of
executive remuneration to tight financial performance assessments may not be optimal. Furthermore, it
26might encourage short-termism. The concentration of voting rights and the establishment of protection
against external takeovers might favour the establishment of a permanent ownership base. This, in turn, could
enhance blockholders’ abilities and incentives to monitor risky investments, and encourage those that are
likely to generate innovation.
275. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to assess the extent to which the corporate governance profile of European firms
may affect their investments in R&D and innovative activities. This paper presents one of the first
microeconomic empirical analyses to cover several countries and to rely on a rich dataset characterising the
entire governance structure. This investigation was motivated, in part, by two recent policy debates: the
widespread discussions of executives’ remuneration packages and Europe’s failed Lisbon agenda. In terms of
the first issue, criticisms have been voiced since the start of the 2008 crisis and remuneration packages
remain a bone of contention. Regardless of whether the issue at hand is the golden parachutes of chief
executive officers or the end-of-year bonuses of traders, the wage structure attracts attention. The latter issue
relates to the relatively weak propensity in Europe to invest in R&D. The European R&D intensity has averaged
less than 2% of GDP for more than 20 years, while it has averaged 3% or more in the US and Japan. 
Based on such considerations, we empirically assessed the impact on R&D intensity of four broad
dimensions of corporate governance - the board of directors (BD), the audit and control process (AC),
shareholders’ rights (SR) and the executive remuneration system (ER) – based on a new dataset of 279
Western European companies. The main results suggest that the global corporate governance score of a firm
is negatively correlated with its R&D intensity. However, a more detailed investigation shows that the
dimensions related to the characteristics of the “board of directors” and to the “audit and control” profiles do
not affect a firm’s propensity to invest in R&D. At the same time, the other components –in particular,
shareholder-protection devices and executive remuneration systems – play a significant role in influencing
the propensity to invest in long-term innovative projects.  
These results confirm that the principal-agent tension (the relationship between shareholders and managers)
indeed affects R&D orientation in R&D-intensive companies. They also illustrate two types of expectations:
28the expectations of the shareholders regarding company performance and managers’ attitudes, and the
expectations of the managers regarding their own risks and remuneration. 
It seems, therefore, that traditional governance tools might generate some unintended consequences, and
that they have the potential to hamper ambitious strategies and innovative projects. It could be argued that a
good governance mechanism should improve management efficiency and that, in turn, R&D expenses could
be reduced without a loss of innovativeness. However, the evidence seems to favour an alternative
explanation. Some governance trends might not fit the profile of highly R&D-intensive firms. Governance
practices that are designed to respond to the short-term expectations of financial markets might prove to be
detrimental to long-term R&D investments. Furthermore, governance provisions emphasising financial
control and the contestability within the ownership base of firms could ultimately discourage innovation and
risk-taking. In this respect, the results presented in this paper are in line with recent evidence from the United
States suggesting that publicly-listed companies significantly reduced their R&D investments after the SOX
reforms were introduced (Bargeron et al, 2009; Cohen et al, 2009). 
One implication of these results is that a regulatory framework that imposes uniform corporate governance
requirements on all type of firms could have negative consequences. In particular, firms operating in sectors
with high growth opportunities and in those that require high levels of R&D expenditures might need different
governance mechanisms than companies operating in more stable or predictable environments. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is subject to some limitations and drawbacks, which create
additional research opportunities. For instance, the dependent variable – R&D intensity – is an imperfect
measure of a firm’s propensity to innovate. In addition, the paper does not assess the impact of R&D
investments on productivity. Further research could, therefore, adopt alternative measures based on output
measures, such as citation-weighted patents (Lee, 2005), new product introductions (Kochhar and David,
291996) or corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra, 1996). In addition, the empirical exercise is limited to large,
publicly listed companies and it might not be valid for other types of firms. An interesting extension of this
work could be to analyze the influence of multiple corporate governance arrangements on the innovative
behaviour and performance of young, technology-based companies. Finally, the external financial and
institutional context may moderate the relationship between companies’ corporate governance practices and
R&D investments (Munari et al, 2010). Further work based on multi-country datasets may focus on more
detailed variables that measure specific aspects of the institutional context that could influence the
relationship.
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37Table A.1. Number of observations per country, sector and year in each database
Corp. Gov. Final R&D
Supersector    
Automobiles 34 28 144
Basic resources 34 9 95
C h e m i c a l s 5 43 41 8 2
Construction and materials 83 19 83
Consumer services 279 30 154
Financials 269 19 101
Food and beverage 66 24 128
Health care 42 35 431
Industrial goods and services 167 62 842
Personal and household goods 43 15 176
Technology 98 59 551
Telecommunications 43 27 127
Utilities-energy 103 48 149
Country
Austria 14 6 89
Belgium 33 13 111
D e n m a r k 2 81 51 2 7
F i n l a n d 3 11 22 0 4
France 234 85 367
Germany 109 56 562
Greece 25 10
Ireland 32 3 32
I t a l y 7 31 51 3 0
Luxembourg 7 2 17
Norway 17 9 19
Portugal 15 1 4
S p a i n 8 51 46 5
Sweden 64 20 250
S w i t z e r l a n d 7 42 91 1 8
T h e  N e t h e r l a n d s 7 02 01 4 3
United Kingdom 404 109 915
Year
2003 39 16 503
2004 267 100 687
2005 375 144 983
2006 303 149 990
2007 331 0 0
# obs. 1,315 409 3,163
38Table A.2. Descriptive statistics for all variables, final database
Vigeo variables Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Obs.
Cg-score 46.279 7 91 16.216 409
Industry scoreboard data  
R&D investment (EUR millions) 477.039 3.56 5658 963.077 409
Change t & t-1 (%) 12.193 -73.35 699.73 58.351 395
CAGR 3 years (%) 4.359 -60.18 213.83 25.020 350
Net sales (EUR millions) 18358.390 129 260028 31952.920 409
Change t & t-1 (%) 9.506 -39.22 178.1 18.388 409
CAGR 3 years (%) 7.441 -38.37 118.77 15.841 391
Number of employees 55877.600 290 507641 74040.680 409
Change t & t-1 (%) 4.432 -44 792.7 42.176 407
CAGR 3 years (%) 2.920 -53.17 124.69 16.678 391
Rd/net sales t 4.330 0.01 45.18 6.124 409
Rd/net sales t-1 4.505 0 54.72 6.392 397
Operating profit t (% net sales)  12.046 -201.37 50.52 16.082 409
Operating profit t-1 (% net sales) 10.926 -139.39 51.47 14.919 393
Rd/employee t 11.511 0.04 101.59 17.562 409
Rd/employee t-1 11.596 0 104.19 18.173 396
Market cap. (Eur million) 21863 134 183476 31707 408
Change t & t-1 (%) 26.280 -88.02 1049.19 63.407 377
39Table A.3. Correlation matrix: basic scores
BD-L BD-I BD-R AC-L AC-I AC-R SR-L SR-I SR-R ER-L ER-I ER-R
BD-L 1.000
BD-I 0.476 1.000
0.000
BD-R 0.213 0.355 1.000
0.000 0.000
AC-L 0.504 0.612 0.289 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
AC-I 0.251 0.380 0.176 0.491 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AC-R -0.089 0.036 0.005 -0.029 0.070 1.000
0.072 0.465 0.915 0.562 0.162
SR-L 0.125 0.161 0.122 0.108 0.123 -0.066 1.000
0.012 0.001 0.014 0.029 0.013 0.186
SR-I 0.284 0.367 0.168 0.382 0.402 -0.080 0.235 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.108 0.000
SR-R 0.053 0.065 -0.088 0.093 0.165 0.100 0.160 0.237 1.000
0.285 0.194 0.078 0.061 0.001 0.044 0.001 0.000
ER-L 0.490 0.495 0.308 0.612 0.437 0.006 0.106 0.433 0.141 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.032 0.000 0.004
ER-I 0.383 0.313 0.260 0.508 0.290 -0.121 0.089 0.430 0.193 0.459 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000  
ER-R 0.381 0.382 0.287 0.486 0.279 0.007 0.154 0.451 0.337 0.541 0.488 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.884 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
40Table A.4. Correlation matrix: sub global scores
CGL CGI CGR BD AC SR ER
CGL 1.000
CGI 0.739 1.000
0.000
CGR 0.422 0.499 1.000
0.000 0.000
BD 0.647 0.642 0.410 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
AC 0.514 0.603 0.364 0.526 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SR 0.393 0.382 0.465 0.220 0.278 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ER 0.646 0.704 0.495 0.601 0.550 0.414 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table A.5. Principal Component Analysis 
1. Global score (coordinates on Comp1) 
Summary statistics of the variables
Variable Mean     Std. Dev.     Min.     Max.
BD 51.292 19.870 0 98
AC 49.039 16.594 6 87
SR 50.479 22.621 0 100
ER 34.681 24.520 0 100
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 2.329 1.501 0.582 0.582
Comp2 0.828 0.343 0.207 0.789
Comp3 0.485 0.127 0.121 0.910
Comp4 0.358 0.090 1.000
Eigen vectors used to compute the coordinates
Variable Comp1
BD 0.523
AC 0.518
SR 0.371
ER 0.566
41Table A.6. Impact of corporate governance practices (CG score and PCA) on R&D intensity (GLM
regressions)
  1  2 3 4 
CG score -0.02  
 0.02  
Global score (PCA) -0.03 ***
  0.01  
Empl 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
The Netherlands 0.21 0.35 0.47 0.87  
Switzerland and Austria 0.45 0.88 0.94 1.09  
Southern countries -3.32 ** 0.24 0.16 0.21  
Nordic countries -2.38 ** -0.75 -0.70 -0.34  
France, Belgium and Luxembourg -0.62 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02  
The UK and Ireland -1.35 0.54 1.04 2.14 **
Automobiles 3.18 *** 3.07 *** 2.68 **
Personal and household goods 0.84 0.69 0.38  
Financials -0.07 -0.10 0.05  
Telecommunications 0.00 0.03 0.14  
Health care 12.52 *** 12.42 *** 12.14 ***
Food and beverage -0.23 -0.28 -0.61  
Chemicals 2.18 * 2.16 * 2.15 *
Technology 9.47 *** 9.50 *** 9.37 ***
Utilities-energy -0.89 -0.85 -0.88  
Industrial goods and services 2.70 *** 2.64 *** 2.38 **
Construction basic -0.72 -0.73 -0.82  
2004 -1.81 -0.37 -0.21 -0.23  
2005 -2.81 * -0.99 -0.89 -0.65  
2006 -1.99 -1.01 -0.88 -0.58  
Constant term 8.30 *** 2.02 2.64 3.76 ***
#  obs. 409  409  409  409  
AIC 6.46   5.83  5.83  5.82  
BIC 12054.55   4958.56  4946.22  4832.74  
For each score variable: coefficient and standard error
Significance: * at 10%, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%
Global score comes from a PCA of CG1, CG2, CG3 and CG4
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